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 1. Introduction 
Politicians, when in oﬃce, have strong incentives to choose policies that will maximise their re-election prospects and
promote their partisan agenda. The inﬂuence of government incentives on policy choices has been explored by the political
cycle theories. The opportunistic (or electoralist) theories argue that all governments, regardless of ideological orientation,
will manipulate economic policies around elections to raise their chances of being re-elected. The partisan theories claim
that left-wing governments will engage in more income re-distribution and more expansionary policies than right-wing
governments during their time in oﬃce. Opportunism and partisanship are often perceived as competing arguments and
studied separately in the literature. Furthermore, despite the voluminous empirical studies, the evidence regarding which
policy tools are actually preferred by governments for meeting their political aims is still inconclusive. Our paper contributes
to this literature by providing a theoretical framework and empirical evidence on the role of social and military expenditure
in generating political cycles, when politicians are motivated by both opportunistic and partisan considerations. The interac-∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +4401142223412. 
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 tive relationship between the two types of expenditure has been extensively discussed in studies considering the economic
implications of military spending, but has never been systematically analysed within a political cycle framework. 
Why should we expect political cycles to differ in timing and direction across social and military expenditure? A strong
motivation can be found in a line of research arguing that the government faces a tradeoff between “butter” and “guns”: if
it devotes more resources to military activities without increasing the total budget, civilian sectors of the economy must pay
by foregoing beneﬁts they would otherwise receive, and vice versa ( Russett, 1982 ). Since expenses for social programs have
a more direct and more immediate political inﬂuence on voters during peace time than do military expenditure, increased
allocations to “butter” in election years can partly occur at the expense of “guns” ( Mintz, 1988 ). Central to “butter-vs-guns”
thesis is also the role of government ideology in shaping budget priorities. Following the partisan theory claims, we would
expect that left-wing governments will spend more than right-wing governments. However, given that right-wing parties
tend to be more pro-military and in favour of a strong national defence ( Klingemann et al., 1994; Whitten and Williams,
2011 ), we should also expect ideology to have the opposite effect on military spending. 
Rogoff (1990) was the ﬁrst to predict that electoral cycles can take the form of changes in the composition (rather than
the level) of government spending. According to his model, each politician has a competence level, which is considered
to be private information, and voters use the part of government spending they observe to make inferences about post-
electoral competence. As a result, the incumbent tries to signal his competence before the election by shifting government
outlays towards the more “visible” public goods and away from investment. Following the competence argument, Shi and
Svensson (2006) show that electoral cycles can emerge even if most voters observe all government expenses, as long as
some voters are uninformed. Thus, electoral cycles are more likely in developing countries ( Shi and Svensson, 2006 ) or in
“young democracies” ( Brender and Drazen, 2005 ), due to lower access to free media or lack of familiarity with electoral
politics. In a recent study, Drazen and Eslava (2010) support the existence of election-year ﬁscal manipulation in countries
with sophisticated, well-informed voters, who are averse to high overall government spending. According to their model,
citizens value government spending on some goods but not others, and rational, forward looking voters use the composition
of public expenditure to make inferences about the incumbent’s preferences. Electoral manipulation thus takes the form of
shifting spending towards the goods that voters prefer in the attempt to convince them that the incumbent shares their
spending priorities. 
In this paper, we build a theoretical model to analyse how governments use the tradeoff between “butter” and “guns” as
a means of advancing their electoral and partisan objectives. As in Drazen and Eslava (2010) , the model relies on information
asymmetries regarding how much politicians care about voters’ utility, and focuses on a society with rational and forward-
looking voters, who observe all government expenses; that is, the case of developed established democracies. Unlike the
existing literature, the model rationalises the role of social and military expenditure in generating electoral compositional
budget cycles and identiﬁes the factors that shape the tradeoff between the two types of expenditure. It also shows that
these electoral cycles can emerge in an environment in which governments have also partisan motivations. In particular,
we argue that in all democratic countries voters tend to favour welfare spending (such as, old age, housing and health pro-
grams) and reward incumbents with the same spending choices. In addition, they assign low priority to military spending,
as they consider it to be less important in periods of peace. 1 Politicians, on the other hand, differ in the value they assign to
the two types of spending (which cannot be observed by voters), and, regardless of ideology, they all prefer to spend more
on the military and less on social programs compared to voters. The latter is consistent with the argument that national
defence is perceived by politicians as a general measure of status and prestige. 2 Voters cannot (ex ante) distinguish between
politicians who manipulate the budget composition to attract votes and those whose spending preferences are consistent
with what voters want. Hence, they form expectations regarding the type of politician (and thus the post-electoral spend-
ing) by observing the pre-electoral allocation to the two goods. Before the election, an incumbent politician will shift the
composition of spending towards social welfare and away from defence to signal that his preferences are close to those of
voters, which, in turn, will produce an electoral compositional budget cycle. The size of this cycle in our model changes
when countries are involved in conﬂicts. In such economies, voters assign a relatively higher value to military spending
due to security considerations, and their spending priorities become more aligned with those of politicians. As a result, a
butter-vs-guns tradeoff becomes a less effective signal of the politician’s type and the electoral cycle is now less pronounced.
Finally, according to our model, politicians’ spending decisions are also inﬂuenced by their ideological positions: left-wing
governments tend to favour generous welfare policies and dovish foreign policies, whereas right-wing governments tend to
favour austere welfare policies and hawkish foreign policies. This leads to the appearance of partisan cycles in the two types
of expenditure, which can coincide with the compositional budget cycle of electoral-calendar timing. 
We then test the main predictions of the theoretical model. Using data from a panel of 22 OECD countries from 1988
to 2009, we provide robust empirical evidence in line with these predictions. Our ﬁndings can be summarised as follows.1 Wlezien (1996) shows that voters respond rather quickly to defence appropriations decisions and that policymakers respond directly to public prefer- 
ences for defence spending and adjust its appropriations accordingly. 
2 Scholars of international relations almost unanimously agree that leaders are very concerned about the reputation and status of their state (see for 
example, Snyder and Diesing, 1977; McMahon, 1991; Mercer, 2010; Dafoe et al., 2014 ). Although the main factor determining a country’s military expen- 
diture is what it can afford, “st atus and prestige are certainly important and to be a proper state is thought to require armed forces” ( Smith, 2009 , p. 97). 
Ambition is a main motive for increasing military spending, as leaders are inherently ambitious and their forward-looking foreign policies require high 
investment in military spending ( Castillo et al., 2001 ). 
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 First, governments tend to bias outlays towards social expenditure and away from military expenditure at election times,
lending support to a “butter-vs-guns” tradeoff within an electoral competition setting. Second, these effects become more 
pronounced when we exclude the countries with increased conﬂict involvement, where national security can play an impor-
tant role on voter choice. Third, partisan distinctions are clearly discernible but differ between the two types of expenditure:
while certain categories of social expenditure are higher during left administrations, military expenditure is higher during
right administrations. These ﬁndings can explain why studies that treat electoral effects as symmetric across different ex-
penditure categories and different countries, and fail to appreciate that political ideology has different dimensions, may ﬁnd
weak empirical support for the existence of political cycles. 
Our paper has also important contributions to the empirical literature of political cycles in OECD countries. Prior empiri-
cal studies on this topic concentrate their analysis on the inﬂuence of government ideology and do not investigate electoral
cycles ( Potrafke, 2009; 2011 ), or focus on the detection of partisan and electoral effects in the overall level of social expen-
diture ( Herwartz and Theilen, 2014 ). Furthermore, existing political cycle studies looking at compositional budget changes
either ignore the impacts on military spending or employ the same empirical speciﬁcation for all types of expenditure.
Failure to control for important determinants of a country’s military burden (such as, international threats, military inter-
ventions, the presence of an arms race, conﬂicts, alliances) is a serious concern when studying the inﬂuence of politics on
military spending, as it leads to omitted variable bias. Our paper addresses these issues using the most recent data on social
and military expenditure, a rich set of control variables, and the most recently developed econometric techniques. Moreover,
it contributes to the literature on the interaction effects of globalization and government ideology. Recent empirical evidence
points to the conclusion that the partisan inﬂuence on social expenditure in OECD countries has decreased over the past
three decades, and several authors relate this ﬁnding to the effects of globalization. 3 Our results show that, while ideology
has indeed lost some of its inﬂuence on the overall level of social spending, it has become more important for certain social
policy areas. This suggests that globalization does not eliminate partisan cycles; it only directs politicians effort towards
certain social policy programs. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews brieﬂy related studies; Section 3 presents our theoretical framework;
Section 4 describes the data on social and military expenditure; Section 5 outlines the empirical model speciﬁcation;
Section 6 reports the empirical results and investigates their robustness; Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background 
Rogoff (1990) ’s electoral compositional budget cycle predicts that electoral incentives may induce the incumbent to shift
public spending towards “visible” government current consumption and away from capital investment goods. A number of
studies lend empirical support to this prediction using either multi-county panel data ( Schuknecht, 20 0 0; Vergne, 20 09;
Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012 ) or data for local government elections ( Schneider, 2010; Veiga and Veiga, 2007 ). However,
whether elections give rise to a substitution of capital for current expenditure or the opposite is still debatable. Katsimi
and Sarantides (2012) point out that this can be attributed to different perceptions of which categories of public spending
are actually “more visible”. A common feature of the aforementioned studies is that they focus on speciﬁc categories of
non-defence spending and fail to appreciate that military expenditure (which cannot be characterised by “low visibility”)
may also be sacriﬁced around elections as one way to enable increases in civilian expenditure. The tradeoff between “but-
ter” and “guns” is very well established in the literature on the economic implications of military spending ( Whitten and
Williams, 2011 ) and the causes of civil conﬂict ( Caruso, 2010 ), but has never been systematically analysed within an electoral
competition setting. 4 
In a recent study, Efthyvoulou (2012) shows that the size of electoral ﬁscal cycles is negatively correlated with non-
economic voting: the higher the level of non-economic voting, the weaker are politicians’ incentives to manipulate ﬁscal
policy as fewer voters can be inﬂuenced by an electoral boom in targeted welfare expenditures. This may also imply that
in countries where non-economic matters are high on the public’s political agenda, politicians may choose to pursue an
appropriate set of non-economic policies to signal that their concerns are close to those of voters. While most categories
of government spending are directly linked to redistributive policies, such as unemployment and old age beneﬁts, defence
spending is highly associated with non-economic priorities. This suggests that the extent to which politicians make “butter-
vs-guns” tradeoffs may vary across countries and that the magnitude of the resulting effects may be determined by election
politics and external security concerns. 
A related literature focuses on the inﬂuence of electoral accountability on the likelihood of war. On one hand, Hess and
Orphanides (1995 ; 2001 ) argue that an incumbent with low performance in handling the domestic economy has incentives
to wage a conﬂict so as to display war leadership capabilities and increase the odds of re-election. In a similar vein, Conconi3 For a detailed discussion of the literature on the interaction effects of globalization and government ideology, see Dreher, Sturm and Ursprung 
(2008) and Meinhard and Potrafke (2012) . 
4 The available empirical studies on electoral defence spending cycles are solely based on single-country evidence and do not reach conclusive results: 
Nincic and Cusack (1979) show that the US military spending rises during the two years preceding the elections; Dalen and Swank (1996) show that the 
Dutch defence spending increases in election years; Mintz (1988) ﬁnds that the Israeli compensation of employees in the military sector is smaller in the 
year prior to elections (but no evidence of electoral effects in programs such as the procurement of weapons); and, Zuk and Woodbury (1986) and Karagöl 
and Turhan (2008) fail to ﬁnd any trace of electoral cycles in military expenditure in the United States and Turkey, respectively. 
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 et al. (2014) ﬁnd that democratic dyads, in which one or both leaders are subject to binding term limits, are involved in
armed conﬂicts as often as autocratic or mixed dyads. Interestingly, they also ﬁnd that conﬂicts are less likely to occur
during the ﬁrst mandate. On the other hand, democratic peace theory has long argued that democratic incumbents avoid
costly interstate conﬂicts; for example, due to their desire to be re-elected by conﬂict-averse public (see for example, Russett
and Oneal, 2001 ). In fact, whereas there are political gains at the domestic level from negotiating a resolution to diﬃcult
international issues ( Morrow, 1991 ), the potential target states may strategically avoid conﬂict with a state whose leaders are
experiencing domestic political diﬃculties ( Fordham, 2005 ). Despite the mixed arguments, this discussion clearly suggests
that foreign policies do matter to the electorate and highlights the importance of exploring how the electoral “butter-vs-
guns” tradeoffs may vary with respect to a country’s level of conﬂict involvement. 5 
According to the partisan explanation of economic policy, parties of the left favour more state intervention, income
redistribution and expansionary ﬁscal policies, compared to parties of the right. The empirical evidence strongly supports
partisan effects on the size of the government, and moderately supports partisan effects in some speciﬁc policy areas;
such as, social and welfare spending (see Franzese, 2002 ). In many cases, however, the evidence seems to suggest that
partisan governments’ resource to these policies depends heavily on their international and domestic politico-economic
context. Andrews (1994) ﬁnds that globalization reduces the ability of governments to inﬂuence the domestic economy
and leads to policy convergence, whereas Garrett (1995) and Potrafke (2009) show that globalization does not restrict, but
rather encourages partisan politics. Other studies relate the weakening of partisan inﬂuences over the past three decades
to an increased necessity of austerity ( Kittel and Obinger, 2003 ), the process of European integration ( von Hagen, 2006;
Efthyvoulou, 2011 ), or a general institutional change that took place in the 1990s ( Herwartz and Theilen, 2014 ). 
While various categories of public spending have been widely explored by the partisan cycle literature, very few studies
attempt to explain how partisan politics affect patterns of defence spending. This is partly because most studies of mili-
tary spending focus on the United States, where the two-party/single-government context offers little variation, and partly
because the predictions regarding the direction of effects are not clear-cut. On one hand, left-wing governments may use
military spending as welfare policy in disguise, but, on the other hand, they may reduce military spending because of their
dovish positions on international relations ( Whitten and Williams, 2011 ). The existing empirical evidence is also contradic-
tory. Kollias and Paleologou (2003) ﬁnd that the Greek defence spending is higher during left administrations, Dalen and
Swank (1996) and Karagöl and Turhan (2008) ﬁnd the opposite effects for the Netherlands and Turkey, respectively, whereas
Potrafke (2011) and Kauder and Potrafke (2015) ﬁnd no evidence of partisan military cycles in OECD countries and Germany,
respectively. Clearly, more analysis and empirical work are needed in order to determine which argument is more consistent
with historical experience. 
3. A theoretical model 
Building upon the framework developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) , Rogoff (1990) and Drazen and Eslava (2010) , we
now present a theoretical model that explains how politicians use the butter-vs-guns tradeoff to increase their re-election
chances and to promote their partisan objectives. The aim of the model is threefold: ﬁrst, to understand why citizens vote for
politicians who engage in such tradeoff for opportunistic purposes, and under which conditions this can be an equilibrium;
second, to identify factors that shape this electoral ﬁscal manipulation; and, third, to outline how electoral and partisan
cycles, two phenomena which are usually studied separately, can co-exist when we focus on social and military spending. 
3.1. Voters 
We consider a simple two-period economy in which elections take place at the end of period 1 and two candidates
(parties) face each other: an incumbent I and a challenger C . 6 Voters derive utility from two different types of public goods:
social expenditure g t and military expenditure m t . In addition, they derive utility from the ideological stance of the politician
in oﬃce. Thus, the utility of voter i with ideology π i in period t = 1 , 2 can be written as 
V i t = f (g t ) + W b(m t ) −
(
π i − πQ 
)2 
, Q ∈ { I, C } (1)
where W takes the value 1 if the country is in conﬂict, and 0 otherwise, capturing the fact that voters care about military
expenditure only in the face of conﬂict, 7 and 
(
π i − πQ 
)
represents the distance between the ideology of the voter and
the ideology of the politician in power Q ∈ { I, C }. We assume that voters have preferences over the two goods which are
separable, and that the two functional forms satisfy f ′ ( g t ) > 0, f ′ ′ ( g t ) < 0, b ′ ( m t ) > 0, b ′ ′ ( m t ) < 0. 5 Note that the argument that leaders sometimes go to war to divert attention from domestic problems is controversial and imbued with caveats and 
exceptions; for example, the country must experience a recession. We therefore refrain from directly tackling this issue, which also falls outside the scope 
of our paper. 
6 Although we consider a two period model, our results also hold under a more complex dynamic model in which the weight the politician puts on 
voters changes every two periods. 
7 This allows us to simplify our analysis. It must be stressed, however, that the results are robust to an alternative speciﬁcation in which voters assign 
positive value to military spending in every period and this value is relatively higher when the country is in conﬂict. 
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 At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent politician decides on the spending allocation to the two goods. The election
takes place at the end of period 1 and voters decide whether to vote for the incumbent or the challenger. The present
expected discounted utility of individual i in period 1 is given by 
U i 1 = V i 1 (I) + βE 1 V i 2 (Q ) 
where β is the discount factor and E 1 is the expectation operator conditional on information in period 1. A voter prefers the
incumbent over the challenger if he expects to receive more utility from the former in period 2. 
We also assume that a military conﬂict, when occurs, lasts for both periods. We will therefore examine how the politico-
economic equilibria look like under two scenarios: one in which the country is in peace and one in which the country is in
conﬂict. 8 
3.2. Politicians 
The incumbent politician must decide at any point in time how to allocate resources to the two goods, g t and m t . 
9 Thus,
the budget constraint of the government is given by 
s t = g t + m t 
All politicians are characterised by the following utility function 
V 
P| Q 
t = ω P 
[ 
f (g t ) + W b(m t ) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πQ 
)2 ] + l(π P ) h (m t ) ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
ideology 
+ D P t 
⎡ 
⎣ n (m t ) ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
status 
+ X 
⎤ 
⎦ − (π P − πQ )2 (2) 
where the function V 
P| Q 
t indicates the current level of utility of a politician P when politician Q is in oﬃce, ω P is the weight
the politician puts on voters, N is the constant population size, and D P t takes the value 1 if P is in oﬃce and 0 otherwise. 
The ﬁrst part of Eq. (2) captures how much the politician cares about voters. The second part captures the utility derived
from military expenditure conditional on the politician’s ideological position π P , as we expect right-wing politicians to
be more concerned about defence and national security compared to their left-wing counterparts. We assume that the
function h ( m t ) satisﬁes h 
′ ( m t ) > 0 and h ′ ′ ( m t ) < 0, and, without loss of generalisation, that l ′ ( πP ) > 0. The third part of
Eq. (2) captures the returns to political power, which consists of two elements: the value of “status” n ( m t ) associated with
investment in military spending (with n ′ ( m t ) > 0 and n ′ ′ ( m t ) < 0) and a ﬁxed value X of being in oﬃce. Finally, the fourth
part of Eq. (2) captures the disutility of having a different ideology represented in oﬃce. 
The weight ω P is known to the politician, but is only observed by voters after the election. Thus, before the election,
voters try to infer the value of ω P from the incumbent’s spending decisions in period 1. For simplicity and to avoid excessive
notation, we assume that there are two types of politicians with weights { ω H , ω L }. We denote with Pr (ω P = ω H ) = p the
probability that the politician is a “good” politician (cares a lot about voters) and with Pr (ω P = ω L ) = 1 − p the probability
that the politician is a “bad” politician (does not care much about voters). Also, we assume for simplicity that ω H → ∞ (the
good politician only cares about voters and not himself), although our results do not strictly depend on this assumption. We
will solve the problem by backward induction and focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. 
3.3. Equilibrium 
The post-election period. In the post-election period, the incumbent politician maximises his current level of utility. A good
politician chooses the budget composition that maximises the voters’ current utility, which depends on the military condi-
tion of the country. When the country is in peace, he allocates all the budget to social expenditure. When the country is in
conﬂict, he chooses the level of social expenditure, g ∗, such that 
f ′ (g ∗) − b ′ ( s − g ∗) = 0 (3) 
Note that the concavity of both functions ensures that an optimal solution with 0 < g ∗ < s exists. 10 Consequently, in period
t = 2 , a good politician plays the following strategy: 
g 2 (ω P = ω H upslopeI) = 
{
s if W = 0 
g ∗ otherwise 
}
(4) 
A bad politician, instead, cares also about himself. He thus chooses the level of social expenditure, g ∗∗, such that 
ω L 
[
f ′ (g ∗∗) −W b ′ ( s − g ∗∗) 
]
− l(π I ) h ′ ( s − g ∗∗) − n ′ ( s − g ∗∗) = 0 8 In a more complete model in which we allow for uncertainty about the existence of a conﬂict after the elections, our main results will not be altered. 
However additional elements, like the probability of having a conﬂict, will re-deﬁne the parameter space under which the electoral cycle equilibrium holds. 
While interesting, this dimension is beyond the scope of our paper. 
9 Since the aim of the model is to show how political parties manipulate the budget composition to get re-elected, we assume that the volume of public 
expenditure is ﬁxed. 
10 The solution is interior as long as f ′ (0) > b ′ ( s ) and f ′ ( s ) < b ′ (0). 
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 Note that b ′ (.), h ′ (.) and n ′ (.) are all positive and thus g ∗∗ < g ∗ < s . 11 Also note that a bad politician chooses a higher level
of military expenditure because higher investment in armed forces can improve his “status”, and, if right-wing, satisfy his
hawkish foreign policy preferences. 12 Rearranging the previous equation we obtain 
ω L f 
′ (g ∗∗) = ω L W b ′ ( s − g ∗∗) + l(π I ) h ′ ( s − g ∗∗) + n ′ ( s − g ∗∗) (5)
The left-hand-side (LHS) of Eq. (5) is monotonically decreasing in g , while the right-hand-side (RHS) is monotonically in-
creasing in g . As long as ω L > 0, an interior solution exists. Moreover, it follows from (5) , that: (i) the level of social ex-
penditure g ∗∗ is a positive function of the weight ω L and a negative function of the incumbent’s ideology π I ; and, (ii) when
 = 1 (the country is in conﬂict), the bad politician chooses a lower level of social expenditure, g ∗∗∗, such that g ∗∗∗ < g ∗∗.
Consequently, in period 2, a bad politician plays the following strategy: 
g 2 (ω P = ω L upslopeI) = 
{
g ∗∗(π I ) if W = 0 
g ∗∗∗(π I ) otherwise 
}
(6)
The above results can be summarised in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. In the post-election period: (i) good politicians choose a higher level of social expenditure than bad politicians;
(ii) all politicians, regardless of ideology, choose higher levels of military expenditure when the country is in conﬂict; (iii) politi-
cians favouring more hawkish foreign policies and less generous social assistance (right-wing politicians) choose a higher level of
military expenditure (lower level of social expenditure), regardless of the military condition of the country. 
The election period. In the election period, good politicians always choose the budget composition that is most preferred
by voters and thus provide the maximum possible level of social expenditure (as they do in the post-election period); that
is, g 2 (ω P = ω H upslopeI) = g 1 (ω P = ω H upslopeI) . Bad politicians, on the other hand, follow the good politicians’ strategy only when the
beneﬁts of doing this outweigh the costs. In this subsection, we will explore this issue by making a distinction between a
peaceful economy and a country in conﬂict. 
The peaceful economy. In the election period, a bad incumbent politician chooses the budget composition that corre-
sponds to g 1 = s only when: 
U I (g 1 = s/ω P = ω L )  U I (g 1 = g ∗∗(π I ) /ω P = ω L ) 
It can be shown (see Appendix A.3.1 for details) that this condition is satisﬁed when 
H(g ∗∗(π I )) + (n 
(
s − g ∗∗(π I ) 
)
≤ βρ( s ) 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ (H(g ∗∗(π I )) − H(g ∗∗(πC )) )+ pH(g ∗∗(πC )) ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
rents from policy choices 
+ n 
(
s − g ∗∗(π I ) 
)
+ X ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
rents from political power 
+ 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ (7)
where ρ( s ) = ρ( s ) − ρ(g ∗∗(π I )) and ρ(.) is the politician’s expected probability of re-election from choosing a certain
budget composition. The LHS of Eq. (7) represents the opportunity cost for the incumbent (with ideology π I ) of choosing
g 1 = s instead of g 1 = g ∗∗(π I ) . It consists of two terms: the ﬁrst term, H ( g ∗∗( π I )), is the loss in utility resulting from his
policy choices, given by 
H(g ∗∗(π I )) = ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(π I )) − f (s ) 
)
+ l 
(
π I 
)
h 
(
s − g ∗∗(π I ) 
)
(8)
whereas the second term, (n 
(
s − g ∗∗(π I ) 
)
, is the loss in “status” associated with lower military spending. As shown in Eq.
(8) , H ( g ∗∗( π I )) consists of two elements: (i) the value of voters’ disutility from the implemented policy being far away
for what they prefer; and, (ii) the loss to the incumbent from implementing a policy that does not reﬂect his ideological
preferences (which increases when the politician is on the right of the political spectrum). 
The RHS of Eq. (7) represents the future expected beneﬁts for the incumbent (with ideology π I ) from choosing g 1 = s
instead of g 1 = g ∗∗(π I ) . This is captured by the current value of the expected re-election rents multiplied by the expected
increased probability of re-election, ρ( s ), when he chooses g 1 = s instead of g 1 = g ∗∗(π I ) . More precisely, the ﬁrst term in
brackets (on the RHS of Eq. (7)) is the gain to the incumbent from implementing his preferred policies in the post-election
period, the second term represents the rents of holding oﬃce, and the third term, , is the change in utility reﬂecting the
incumbent’s preferred ideology. Speciﬁcally,  is written as 
 = ω L 
[ 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πC 
)2 
N 
−
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − π I 
)2 
N 
] 
+ 
(
π I − πC 
)2 11 Assume that ω L is low enough such that: ω L f 
′ (s ) < l(π I ) h ′ (0) + n ′ (0) . This ensures that the bad politician does not want to allocate all sources to 
social expenditure. 
12 Assume that the larger the value of π I , the more to the right the politician is. 
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 that is, the sum of: (i) the gain (loss) to the incumbent from the implemented ideological policy being close (far) from
that of voters; and, (ii) the incumbent’s own utility gain from having the implemented policy representing his ideological
position rather than that of his opponent. 
The electoral tradeoff between “butter” and “guns” is clearly reﬂected in Eq. (7) . If the incumbent politician provides
butter to voters in the election period, he will lose the rents associated with choosing a higher level of guns, but he will
increase the probability of being re-elected in the next period. This, in turn, will allow him to obtain certain gains: one as-
sociated with holding oﬃce (entering both the opportunity cost today and the future expected beneﬁts) and one associated
with partisanship (included in the H term). 
To sum up, in the election period, a bad politician plays the following strategy: 
g 1 (ω P = ω L upslopeI) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
s 
if (7) holds 
with strict inequality 
s with probability 
q ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] if (7) holds 
0 otherwise 
⎫ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎭ 
The economy in conﬂict. When the economy is in conﬂict, the strategy for each type of politician changes slightly, re-
placing g 1 = s by g 1 = g ∗ and g ∗∗( π I ) by g ∗∗∗( π I ). 13 Since s > g ∗ > g ∗∗( π I ) > g ∗∗∗( π I ), we cannot say with certainty whether
the variation in military expenditure between the election period and the post-election period depends on the military
condition of the country. Under restrictive assumptions, however, it can be shown that the electoral reduction in military
spending is indeed smaller when the economy is in conﬂict than when the economy is in peace. The following proposition
focuses on this result. 
Proposition 2. If the economy is in conﬂict and ω L → 0, then military expenditure is subject to less electoral manipulation. 
Proof. Notice that g ∗∗∗( π I ) is obtained from the following condition: 
ω L f 
′ (g ∗∗∗(π I )) = ω L b ′ (s − g ∗∗∗(π I )) + l(π I ) h ′ (s − g ∗∗∗(π I )) + n ′ (s − g ∗∗∗(π I )) 
Also note that, as ω L → 0, g ∗∗∗(π I ) = g ∗∗(π I ) = 0 . Consequently, under a conﬂict environment, the bad politician will choose
g 1 = g ∗ with probability q , while under a peaceful environment, he will choose g 1 = s with the same probability. Since s >
g ∗ and in period 2 both g ∗∗∗( π I ) and g ∗∗( π I ) collapse to zero, the result follows. 
3.4. Voting behaviour 
The voter i votes for the incumbent if he expects to receive higher utility in t = 2 under the incumbent than under the
challenger; that is, when the following condition holds: 
E [ U(g 2 /I, g 1 ) ] −
(
π i − π I 
)2  E [ U(g 2 /C) ] − (π i − πC )2 (9) 
In period 1 the voter does not observe how much the incumbent or the challenger care about him. To infer the challenger’s
type, he can only use information about the (ex-ante) distribution of ω P . On the other hand, to infer the incumbent’s type,
he can also use the information provided by the realised value g 1 . We assume that the voter uses the Bayes’ rule to ob-
tain Pr (ω P = ω H /g 1 ) . Note that Pr (g 1 = g ∗∗(π I ) /ω P = ω H ) = 0 , and thus, Pr (g 1 = s/ω P = ω H ) = 1 ( g 1 = g ∗∗∗(π I ) and g 1 = g ∗,
respectively, under conﬂict). 14 Applying the Bayes’ rule (see Appendix A.3.3 for details), we have that 15 
Pr (ω P = ω H /g 1 = s ) = p 
p + (1 − p) q (10) 
Using previous information, Eq. (9) can be written as 
p (g 1 ) 
[
f ( ˜  g 2 ) − f (g 2 (π I )) + W 
[
b ( s − ˜ g 2 ) − b 
(
s − g 2 (π I ) 
)]]
> 
(
π i − π I 
)2 −(π i − πC )2 (11) 
where ˜ g 2 ∈ { s, g ∗} and g 2 ( π I ) ∈ { g ∗( π I ), g ∗∗( π I )} depending on whether the economy is in conﬂict, and, p (g 1 ) = p (g 1 ) − p
reﬂects how voters change their beliefs about the type of the incumbent when they observe g 1 . The LHS of Eq. (11) repre-
sents the expected gain (loss) in utility from public good consumption if the incumbent is re-elected, while the RHS repre-
sents the cost (beneﬁts) in terms of ideology if the re-election occurs. The RHS will be positive when the voter’s ideology is
further away from that of the incumbent than from that of the challenger. 
Note that the sign of this inequality depends on the ideology of the voter and the spending decisions of politicians.
For simplicity, we assume that there exist three types of voters based on ideological preferences: the incumbent’s core
voters ( ˆ  π I ) , the challenger’s core voters ( ˆ  πC ) and the swing voters ( ˆ  πM ) , who are ideologically in the middle of the two
candidates. The ﬁrst two types always vote for their preferred candidate, regardless of his spending choices in period 1. The13 The expression for Eq. (7) also changes (see Appendix A.3.2 for details). 
14 Note that a good politician will never choose g 1 = g ∗∗(π I ) ( g 1 = g ∗∗∗(π I ) under conﬂict). 
15 When the economy is in conﬂict, we have that: Pr (ω P = ω H /g 1 = g ∗) = p p+(1 −p) q . 
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 swing voters, on the other hand, vote on the basis of the policy actions taken by the incumbent in period 1 ( ˆ  πM = ˆ π I + ˆ πC 2 ) .
Consequently, the behaviour of voters can be summarised in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. (Voting strategies). In an election period, the optimal voting strategy of an individual i with ideology j = { I, M, C }
is given by: (i) if π i = ˆ π I , then he votes for the incumbent with probability 1; (ii) if π i = ˆ πC , then he votes for the challenger
with probability 1; (iii) if π i = ˆ πM , then he votes the incumbent with probability r ( g 1 ), where 
r(g 1 ) = 
{ 
1 if p(g 1 ) > p 
r ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] if p(g 1 )  p 
0 otherwise 
} 
Consider for simplicity that the proportion of voters with an ideology j is given by φj . Let us assume that { φI , φC } are
less than half, otherwise electoral cycles cannot emerge (politicians’ choices have no effect on voting behaviour). Let us also
assume that the winner is chosen by simple majority rule. If p ( g 1 ) < p , the challenger obtains a proportion φ
C + φM of the
votes, and since φI < 1/2 and abstention is not allowed, 16 the challenger wins the elections. If p ( g 1 ) > p , the incumbent
obtains a proportion φI + φM of the votes, and since φC < 1/2, the incumbent will get re-elected. Finally, in case p(g 1 ) = p,
the incumbent will obtain φI + rφM and get re-elected if φI + rφM  1 / 2 . To sum up, the incumbent will remain in oﬃce
when p ( g 1 ) ≥ p , provided that, in case of equality, there is a suﬃciently large number of swing voters ( r  1 / 2 −φ
I 
φM 
) . This has
an important implication: a bad politician who decides to stick to his most preferred spending choices will never win the
elections. 
3.5. Politico-economic equilibria 
We can now characterise the possible politico-economic equilibria and study the properties of these equilibria. A Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium is a vector of strategies and a set of beliefs for politicians and voters such that: (i) the incumbent’s
strategy is optimal given his beliefs and the strategy of voters; (ii) voters’ behaviour is optimal given their own beliefs and
the strategy of politicians; and (iii) politicians’ and voters’ beliefs are consistent with the implied outcomes. In this section,
we will focus on a peaceful economy. Similar equilibria, however, can be obtained when the economy is in conﬂict (see
Appendix A.3.4 for details). 
We can make a distinction between three cases depending on whether condition (7) holds. Note that, for all three cases,
ρ( s ) = 1 , as this constitutes an equilibrium set of beliefs for politicians. 
Case 1: If condition (7) holds with strict inequality, the incumbent will choose to play g 1 = s with probability 1, and the
swing voters will set p(g 1 = s ) = p and zero otherwise. Hence, the swing voters will vote for the incumbent with probability
r  1 / 2 −φ
I 
φM 
17 and the incumbent will get re-elected with probability 1 provided that he plays g 1 = s. 18 In this case we have
a pooling equilibrium since both good and bad politicians are playing the same set of strategies. 
Case 2: If condition (7) holds with strict equality, the incumbent will choose to play g 1 = s with probability q , and the
swing voters will set p 1 (g 1 = s )  p and zero otherwise. The incumbent will thus get re-elected with probability 1 provided
that he plays g 1 = s. 19 In this case we have a mixed equilibrium. 
Case 3: If condition (7) does not hold (LHS of (7) > RHS of (7) ), the incumbent will choose to play g ∗∗( π I ), and the swing
voters will set p(g 1 = s ) = 1 and zero otherwise. Hence, the swing voters will vote for the challenger with probability 1,
resulting in the incumbent losing the elections. In this case we have a separating equilibrium since good and bad politicians
are playing different strategies in the election period. 
3.6. Theoretical predictions 
The discussion in the previous section generates the ﬁrst prediction of our model 
Prediction 1. A tradeoff between “butter” and “guns” can serve as a political-electoral tool. During election periods, politi-
cians shift the composition of public spending towards social expenditure and away from military expenditure to improve
their re-election prospects. 
Proposition 4. The incumbent politician’s ideological positions inﬂuence his spending choices. When the incumbent favours aus-
tere welfare policies and hawkish foreign policies, the average level of military expenditure (social expenditure) is larger (smaller).
Proof. In the election period the incumbent chooses either g 1 = s ( g 1 = g ∗ when the country is in conﬂict) with probability
q or his most preferred level. In the post-election period, he always chooses his most preferred level. Consequently, the16 The results hold when there is abstention, but this is equally distributed across ideologies. 
17 If r < 1 / 2 −φ
I 
φM 
, then the incumbent anticipates that he will not get re-elected and chooses to deviate. 
18 Note that ρ( s ) = 1 is consistent with the equilibrium since ρ(s ) = 1 and ρ(g ∗∗1 (π I )) = 0 . 
19 If q = 1 , then p(g 1 = s ) = p and the incumbent will get re-elected provided that r  1 / 2 −φ
I 
φM 
(which is the pure strategy equilibrium deﬁned above). 
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 average level of military (social) expenditure is larger under an incumbent who favours increased allocations to “guns”
(“butter”). 
This proposition summarises the second prediction of our model 
Prediction 2. Social expenditure are higher during left administrations, whereas military expenditure are higher during right
administrations. 
Proposition 5. When the economy is in conﬂict the average level of military expenditure is larger. 
Proof. When the economy is in conﬂict, the incumbent’s choice in the election period is g 1 = g ∗ with probability q , re-
gardless of his ideology or type. When the economy is in peace, his choice in the election period is g 1 = s with the same
probability. Since s > g ∗ and the post-election level of military expenditure is always larger under a conﬂict environment
(see Proposition 1 (ii)), the result follows. 
Proposition 5 , together with Proposition 2 , lead to the third prediction of our model 
Prediction 3. When the country is in conﬂict: (i) the average level of military expenditure is larger; (ii) military spending
(and thus the budget composition) is subject to less electoral manipulation. The latter does not prevent the occurrence of
partisan cycles: under a conﬂict environment, politicians of both ideologies engage in smaller electoral defence cutbacks. 
We now proceed to test these three predictions. In the next sections, we ﬁrst describe the key features of the data on
social and military expenditure and then specify the empirical model for carrying out the tests. 
4. Data on social and military expenditure 
We consider yearly data on social and military expenditure, as a share of GDP, for 22 OECD countries (see Table A.1 ). Data
on social expenditure are obtained from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) for the period 1981-2009. SOCX in-
cludes social spending ﬂows controlled by the general government that can be attributed to an individual beneﬁciary; hence
excludes pure public goods like national defence. The database groups social expenditure into nine policy areas depending
on their social purpose, 20 with old age, health and family expenditure being the largest spending items. Panel (a) of Fig. 1
illustrates that, on average, public social spending-to-GDP ratios increased most signiﬁcantly in the early 1990s and, again,
at the end of the 20 0 0s. In between these decennial turning points spending-to-GDP ratios changed little; during the 1980s
the average public social spending-to-GDP ratio oscillated around 19%, while after the economic downturn in the early 1990s
it oscillated around 22% (see also Adema et al., 2012 ). 
Data on military expenditure are taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which is con-
sidered to be the most reliable data source on aggregated military expenditure from 1988 onwards. We do not explore mil-
itary spending prior to 1988 since the alternative source which covers this period - the Correlates of War (COW) Database
- is notoriously less accurate ( Bove and Brauner, 2015 ). Moreover, combining the two sources is problematic in terms of
comparability because the exact deﬁnition of what comprises military spending varies over time and across countries, and
these variations are not captured in the same way by the two sources. 21 Panel (b) of Fig. 1 shows that, since the end of the
Cold War, the average military spending-to-GDP ratio has been steadily declining: from 2.4% in 1988 to 1.7% in 2009. This
is primarily a consequence of the demise of the Soviet threat. In addition, during the last decade, most European countries
have been imposing austerity measures to reduce their budget deﬁcits, with heavy cuts in military expenditure. It must be
stressed that 14 out of the 22 sampled OECD countries are members of the NATO military alliance, and thus, contribute to
NATO’s commonly funded budgets. 22 In addition, they support NATO by maintaining forces and assets that they pledge to
NATO through a defence planning process ( Johnson and Thomas, 1999 ). As shown in panel (c) of Fig. 1 , the average military
spending-to-GDP ratio in NATO countries is between 0.7 and 1.2 percentage points higher than in non-NATO countries. 
5. Empirical model speciﬁcation 
To test the predictions of Section 3.6 , we employ an empirical speciﬁcation that builds on the work of Potrafke
(2009) and Efthyvoulou (2012) in the selection and transformation of variables, and takes the following form: 
 ln Y it = α ln Y it−1 + βX it + γ Z it + δ‘Election’ it + ϑ ‘Ideology’ it + μi + λt + ε it (M.1)
where ln Y it is the growth rate of Y it in country i and year t, Y it ∈ {‘TSE’, ‘TME’} is the share of social or military expenditure
to GDP (or the ratio of military-to-social expenditure), X it is a vector of expenditure-speciﬁc control variables, Z it is a vector
of variables capturing economic and politico-institutional constraints; ‘Election’ it and ‘Ideology’ it are indicators coding the20 These areas are: old-age, survivors, incapacity-related beneﬁts, health, family, active labour market policies, unemployment, housing, and other social 
policy areas. 
21 Bove and Brauner (2015) ﬁnd major inconsistencies between SIPRI and COW and emphasise the diﬃculties in extending the SIPRI data backwards in 
time. 
22 NATO alliance members are asked to spend on their militaries a minimum of 2% of GDP; yet, very often members do not meet this target. 
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 timing of elections and the government’s political orientation (with higher values indicating more left-wing governments),
respectively; μi and λt represent country-speciﬁc effects and year-speciﬁc effects, respectively; ε it is an i.i.d . error term. 
The existence of a butter-vs-guns tradeoff at election timing ( Prediction 1 ) is conﬁrmed when the coeﬃcient on
‘Election’ it is positive in the social expenditure equation and negative in the military expenditure equation. Since this
tradeoff is more appealing to voters (and thus military spending is subject to more electoral manipulation) when a country
is in peace ( Prediction 3 ), we expect the coeﬃcient on ‘Election’ it in the military expenditure equation to be larger in abso-
lute value when we exclude the countries involved in conﬂicts. Finally, to verify the existence of partisan effects in the two
types of expenditure of the opposite direction ( Prediction 2 ), the coeﬃcient on ‘Ideology’ it must have a positive sign in the
social expenditure equation and negative in the military expenditure equation. 
Vector X it in the social expenditure equation contains the following commonly used control variables: the growth rate
of real GDP per capita ( ln ‘GDP per capita’) to capture changes in economic development; the growth rate of the unem-
ployment rate ( ln ‘Unemployment’) to capture the inﬂuence of the domestic business cycle; and, the growth rate of the
dependency ratio ( ln ‘Dependency Ratio’) - measured by the ratio of people younger than 15 or older than 64 to the work-
ing age population - to capture social support requirements resulting from changes in population age structures. On the
other hand, vector X it in the military expenditure equation contains the following measures of conﬂict involvement and
security threats: the growth rate of the size of armed forces as a percentage of the labour force ( ln ‘Armed Forces’); the
growth rate of potential and actual enemies’ military expenditure ( ln ‘Rivals’); a 0-1 dummy variable capturing the abo-
lition of the draft and the shift to an all-volunteer force (‘Volunteers’); a 0-1 dummy variable capturing external military
operations and wars 23 (‘Wars’); and, a 0-1 dummy variable coding NATO membership and allowing for the effects of alliance
spill-ins (‘NATO’). Finally, vector X it in the military-to-social expenditure equation includes all the aforementioned control
variables. 
As pointed out in Section 2 , globalization may cause a convergence around market-friendly policies. In addition, separa-
tion of powers can work as a commitment device and moderate politically-driven ﬁscal policy manipulations ( Saporiti and
Streb, 2008 ). To control for such constraints, we include in vector Z it two variables: the growth rate of the KOF index of
economic globalization ( ln ‘Globalization’) and the POLCON index of political constraints (‘Political Constraints’). The KOF23 This variable takes value 1 during year t and year t + 1 of external military operations (for example, ISAF in Afghanistan, UN missions) and/or intra-state 
and inter-state wars. The Correlates of War data set deﬁnes war as sustained combat, involving organised armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,0 0 0 
battle-related deaths. Intra-state (civil) wars refer to those that predominantly take place within the recognised territory of a state, whereas inter-state 
wars to those that take place between states. 
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 index of economic globalization embraces the economic dimension of globalization and is constructed using data on actual
ﬂows and restrictions. On the other hand, the POLCON index of political constraints includes information on veto players,
and thus, measures the degree of institutional constraints on the executive branch of the government. 
The electoral variable ‘Election’ it codes the year the executive is elected. In other words, it equals 1 in the years of
legislative elections in parliamentary countries and in the years of presidential elections in presidential countries, and 0 in
all other years. The partisan variable ‘Ideology’ it is the Potrafke (2009) ’s government ideology index, which places the cabinet
on a left-right scale with values between 1 and 5. Speciﬁcally, it takes the following values: 1 if the share of governing right-
wing parties in terms of the seats in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than 2/3; 2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3; and,
3 if the share of centrist parties is 50% or if the left-wing and right-wing parties form a coalition government that is not
dominated by one side or the other. The index is symmetric and takes the values 4 and 5 if left-wing parties dominate.
Following Potrafke (2009 ; 2012 ), we normalise this variable (mean zero, variance one) so that we can directly interpret the
coeﬃcients and marginal effects across the speciﬁcations. Table A.1 reports the number of elections in the sample, whereas
Table A.2 reports descriptive statistics and data sources for all the aforementioned variables. 
Eq. (M.1) is a standard panel data speciﬁcation, in which all continuous variables are in growth rates. Taking growth
rates offers two advantages: ﬁrst, it avoids problems of spurious inference when the time-series are non-stationary in lev-
els; 24 second, it eliminates time-invariant, country-speciﬁc effects in levels. On the other hand, using growth rates does not
control for potential country-speciﬁc time trends in levels, and thus, it is sensible to estimate Eq. (M.1) using either the
ﬁxed effects or the random effects estimator. A Hausman test indicates that the model with random effects is preferable
to ﬁxed effects for all equations, which is consistent with the fact that our sampled countries are drawn from a larger
population of OECD countries. Hence, we adopt the random effects (RE) estimator 25 and use heteroscedasticity and au-
tocorrelation consistent standard errors to calculate the corresponding test statistics. In addition, in order to account for
the possibility of contemporaneous correlation across countries, we present the results of regressions with panel-corrected
standard errors (PCSE) according to Beck and Katz (1996) , assuming a panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorrelation structure.
An econometric problem that arises here is that the growth rates of public expenditure may exhibit persistence over time,
and thus static model estimates will suffer from omitted variable bias. Tests of statistical signiﬁcance reveal that, while
the estimate of parameter α fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance in the equations of military expenditure and military-to-
social expenditure, it is highly signiﬁcant in the equation of social expenditure. This suggests that social expenditure should
preferably be modelled with a dynamic structure. In accordance with the large sample properties of the GMM methods,
the well-known ﬁrst-differencing and system-GMM estimators are biased in our case and small-sample bias-corrected esti-
mators are more appropriate. Consequently, for the social expenditure equation, we also consider the bias-corrected least-
squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator developed by Bruno (2005) and designed for dynamic panel data models with
small N . 26 
6. Empirical ﬁndings 
6.1. Basic results 
We start by estimating the total social expenditure (‘TSE’) equation for the period 1981-2009 using a dynamic frame-
work (see column (1) of Table 1 ). As a ﬁrst point, we can notice that our proxies for economic development and business
cycle ﬂuctuations (namely, growth rates of per capita GDP and unemployment) display the expected sign and are highly
statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, our results indicate that a higher degree of economic globalization is associated with
a retrenchment in social spending. 27 Turning now to our variables of interest, we ﬁnd evidence conﬁrming the predictions
of our model: the coeﬃcients on ‘Election’ and ‘Ideology’ have the expected positive sign and are statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels of signiﬁcance. Qualitatively, the ﬁndings imply that the growth rate of social expenditure (as a share of24 Indeed, panel unit root tests indicate that some of our variables are non-stationary in levels, but become stationary when transformed into ﬁrst 
difference form. 
25 Note that, in presence of slowly changing variables, ﬁxed effects soak up most of their explanatory power, and they “make it hard for such variables 
to appear either substantively or statistically signiﬁcant” (Beck, 2001, p. 285) . For a number of countries, the ideology variable changes only once during 
the sampled period, and, more generally, some countries can be characterised as ‘more left-wing’ (or ‘more right-wing’), on average, compared to others. 
Thus, by using ﬁxed effects, we fail to capture this variation across countries and lose important information. Despite random effects being our preferred 
method, we do test whether the inferences change when the model is estimated by ﬁxed effects (see Section 6 ). 
26 We choose the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator as the initial estimator in which the growth rates of GDP per capita and unemployment rates 
are treated as endogenous variables and the instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2006) . Since the analytical variance estimator performs 
poorly for large coeﬃcients of the lagged dependent variable ( Bruno, 2005 ), we undertake 200 replications of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated 
standard errors. The results remain qualitatively the same when the Arellano and Bond (1991) and the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) are chosen as initial 
estimators or when we undertake different number of bootstrap replications, such as 50, 100 or 500. The preference of the RE estimator, the PCSE estimator 
and the bias-corrected LSDV in this context is also discussed in Potrafke (2009) . 
27 Using the overall KOF index (instead of its economic subindex) results in a statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient, as in Potrafke (2009) . This suggests that 
the social and political dimensions of globalization do not play an important role in explaining the dynamics of social spending in our sampled countries. 
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Table 1 
Political cycles in social expenditure. 
Dependent variable: ln Total Social Expenditure ( ln TSE), ln Subcomponents of Social Expenditure ( ln SSE). 
1981-2009 1988-2009 
Bias-corrected LSDV Bias-corrected LSDV Random effects Panel-corrected SE 
ln TSE ln SSE ln TSE ln SSE ln TSE ln SSE ln TSE ln SSE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged Dependent 0.203 ∗∗∗ 0.146 ∗∗∗ 0.228 ∗∗∗ 0.233 ∗∗∗
(5.56) (3.91) (5.30) (5.14) 
ln GDP per capita -0.696 ∗∗∗ -0.792 ∗∗∗ -0.800 ∗∗∗ -0.884 ∗∗∗ -0.812 ∗∗∗ -0.903 ∗∗∗ -0.767 ∗∗∗ -0.758 ∗∗∗
(6.95) (7.76) (7.93) (7.44) (6.34) (4.79) (7.47) (6.94) 
ln Unemployment 0.038 ∗∗∗ 0.005 0.030 ∗∗∗ 0.006 0.048 ∗∗∗ 0.020 0.047 ∗∗∗ 0.025 ∗∗
(3.06) (0.40) (2.59) (0.46) (3.83) (1.30) (4.11) (2.05) 
ln Globalization -0.005 ∗∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗ -0.004 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 ∗∗
(2.68) (2.87) (2.48) (2.75) (1.22) (1.34) (1.41) (2.03) 
ln Dependency Ratio 0.211 0.281 0.064 0.311 -0.006 0.220 -0.122 0.351 
(1.10) (1.44) (0.26) (1.04) (0.02) (0.54) (0.48) (1.13) 
Political Constraints -0.013 0.009 -0.013 0.004 -0.032 -0.026 -0.043 ∗∗∗ -0.050 ∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.30) (0.41) (0.12) (1.27) (1.02) (4.39) (4.34) 
Election 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗ 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.006 ∗∗ 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.005 ∗∗
(2.84) (2.74) (2.92) (2.01) (5.13) (2.38) (3.48) (2.19) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) 0.003 ∗∗ 0.004 ∗∗∗ 0.002 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.001 0.005 ∗∗ 0.001 0.004 ∗∗
(2.30) (3.51) (1.43) (2.90) (0.73) (2.26) (0.63) (2.35) 
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 598 598 460 460 460 460 460 460 
Number of N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
R 2 -Overall 0.56 0.40 0.54 0.41 
Columns report estimated coeﬃcients ( z -statistics). ‘SSE’ includes three categories of social expenditure: old age, family and 
incapacity-related beneﬁts. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GDP) increases by about 0.7 percentage points in election years, 28 and by about 0.3 percentage points when the ideology
variable increases by one standard deviation. 
Do left-wing governments generate higher welfare effort by targeting certain, more vulnerable social groups? To answer
this question, we implement the same analysis for all possible combinations of the nine social policy areas, and we ﬁnd
that the impact of partisanship becomes stronger and statistically more robust when we focus on three categories of social
expenditure, namely old age, family and incapacity-related beneﬁts (‘SSE’). As shown in column (2) of Table 1 , once we
allow the dependent variable to include only these programs, the coeﬃcient on ‘Ideology’ becomes larger in absolute value
and is now statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level. On the other hand, the results on the electoral variable remain
essentially the same as those obtained for the aggregated measure. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 report the results when we estimate the same regression set-up for the shorter time
period 1988-2009. This allows us to compare the ﬁndings on social expenditure with those on military expenditure - which
are only available for the post-1987 period - and to investigate the persistence of the reported effects in a period charac-
terised by deepened globalization. Overall, the results conﬁrm the existence of a large election-year increase in the growth
of both aggregated and disaggregated measures of social expenditure (‘TSE’ and ‘SSE’, respectively), but at the same time,
indicate strong partisan shifts only in the latter. This, in turn, suggests that the discipline and compensation effects of glob-
alization do not contradict each other and can actually co-exist. Welfare-enhancing preferences create incentives for leftist
governments to increase social expenditure and compensate citizens for the risks of globalization. However, the discipline
effect of globalization may restrict their capacity to produce partisan cycles in all social welfare programs and direct their
effort towards certain categories. The reported effects largely persist when we consider a static framework (see columns
(5)–(8)). 
We continue by estimating the total 29 military expenditure (‘TME’) equation for the period 1988-2009 using RE. Looking
at column (1) in Table 2 , we can notice that economic development plays an important role in explaining the dynamics of
military spending. Furthermore, we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant growth effects arising from the proportion of the labour
force in armed forces and the level of rivals’ military spending, consistent with the traditional external action-reaction ex-
planation of military expenditure. The variable ‘Wars’ also exerts a positive inﬂuence on the dependent variable. Concerning
our variables of interest, we can see that the coeﬃcient on ‘Ideology’ is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating
that the more to the left a government is, the less will spend on the military (consistent with our theoretical predictions).28 We have also controlled for governments’ behaviour in the year prior to elections. The pre-election variable appears to be statistically insigniﬁcant 
when added to the model, implying that politicians engage in social spending increases only in election years. 
29 Data on components of military expenditure are not currently available for all sampled countries/years to undertake a similar econometric analysis at 
the disaggregated level. 
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Table 2 
Political cycles in military expenditure (1988-2009). 
Dependent variable: ln Total Military Expenditure ( ln TME); Method: random-effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln GDP per capita -0.573 ∗∗∗ -0.561 ∗∗∗ -0.564 ∗∗∗ -0.497 ∗∗∗ -0.585 ∗∗∗ -0.666 ∗∗∗
(3.53) (3.48) (3.43) (2.89) (3.48) (3.77) 
ln Globalization 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.01) (0.29) (0.24) (0.32) (0.46) (0.22) 
ln Armed Forces 0.022 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗
(2.62) (2.51) (2.46) (2.47) (2.47) 
ln Rivals 0.126 ∗∗∗ 0.121 ∗∗∗ 0.134 ∗∗∗ 0.138 ∗∗∗ 0.115 ∗∗
(3.03) (3.00) (2.96) (3.14) (2.47) 
Volunteers 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.0 0 0 0.017 ∗∗
(0.23) (0.28) (0.23) (0.17) (0.07) (2.24) 
Wars 0.017 ∗∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗ 0.009 
(3.01) (3.18) (2.92) (3.01) (2.50) (0.93) 
Political Constraints -0.023 -0.022 -0.024 -0.020 -0.021 -0.074 
(0.82) (0.80) (0.84) (0.74) (0.70) (1.68) 
NATO -0.003 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 
(0.58) (1.39) (0.65) (0.49) (0.82) (0.65) 
Election 0.001 
(0.14) 
Election ∗ NATO 1 0.010 
(1.23) 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.011 ∗∗ -0.012 ∗∗ -0.010 ∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗
(2.42) (2.48) (2.12) (2.20) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.014 ∗∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗
(2.62) (2.59) (2.51) (2.71) (2.34) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.004 ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.004 
(1.69) (1.74) (1.68) (1.71) (1.82) (1.49) 
ln Unemployment 0.021 
(1.36) 
ln Dependency Ratio -0.134 
(0.60) 
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 462 462 462 462 462 336 
Number of N 22 22 22 22 22 16 
R 2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23 
Dependent variable: ln Total Military Expenditure ( ln TME); Method: panel-corrected SE 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.012 ∗∗ -0.012 ∗∗ -0.010 ∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗
(2.01) (2.08) (1.79) (2.01) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.014 ∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗ -0.014 ∗
(2.06) (2.03) (2.10) (2.07) (1.88) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.004 ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.004 ∗ -0.006 ∗
(1.80) (1.78) (1.73) (1.70) (1.69) (1.67) 
Columns report estimated coeﬃcients ( z -statistics). Column (6) excludes the following countries: Canada, France, Italy, Spain, the United King- 
dom and the United States. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence level, respectively. For brevity and comparability, 
the table displays the results of regressions with PCSE only for the variables of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Speciﬁcally, the estimate suggests that the growth rate of military expenditure (as a share of GDP) decreases by about 0.4
percentage points when the ideology variable increases by one standard deviation. Finally, the results in column (1) provide
no evidence of electoral impacts in military spending. 
As noted in Section 4 , nearly two-third of our sampled countries are members of NATO, and as such, they need to
provide suﬃcient funds for modernising and restructuring their defence forces to meet NATO’s requirements. This may
suggest that politicians’ abilities to manipulate military spending for electoral gains are, to some extent, conditioned by
NATO membership. To test this hypothesis, we replace the electoral variable by the interaction terms ‘Election ∗ NATO 1 ’ and
‘Election ∗ NATO 0 ’ (coding elections in NATO and non-NATO members, respectively) and run the same regression as before.
As shown in column (2) of Table 2 , the coeﬃcient on ‘Election ∗ NATO 0 ’ is negative and highly statistically signiﬁcant. A
possible explanation for the failure to ﬁnd electoral shifts in NATO countries is that the necessary defence cutbacks in NATO
members are actually made in the year preceding the election. NATO members are less reliant on soldiers and more on
capital ( Bove and Cavatorta, 2012 ), and spending on physical inputs is more rigid and takes longer to adjust for electoral
purposes compared to spending on military personnel, whose timing is easier to ﬁne tune. We thus experiment with both
pre-election and on-election year cycles and ﬁnd evidence in line with the above explanation: defence spending grows
in smaller than normal proportions during the election year or the year prior to an election depending on whether the
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 country is a member of the NATO alliance 30 (see column (3)). Qualitatively, the ﬁndings suggest that the election-induced
decrease in the growth rate of military spending (as a share of GDP) is 1.1 percentage points in NATO countries (in the pre-
electoral year) and 1.4 percentage points in non-NATO countries (in the electoral year). The reported results are invariant to
tests of robustness, such as, including among the explanatory variables the growth rates of the unemployment rate and the
dependency ratio (see column (4)), and excluding from the model the variables ln ‘Armed Forces’ and ln ‘Rivals’ which
may be endogenous relative to the dependent variable (see column (5)). 
The ﬁndings of the previous ﬁve paragraphs provide robust evidence that supports the predictions of our theoretical
model ( Section 3.6 ). Speciﬁcally, the opposite sign of the electoral variable in the equations of social and military spend-
ing indicate the existence of a butter-vs-guns tradeoff at election timing: increased allocations to “butter” during elections
come partly at the expense of “guns” ( Prediction 1 ). Similarly, the opposite sign of the ideology variable in the two equations
implies that partisanship plays a different role for the two types of expenditure: left-wing governments favour increased al-
locations to “butter”, while right-wing governments favour increased allocations to “guns” ( Prediction 2 ). At the same time,
our results point to the complexity of electoral and partisan effects, as outlined by the literature on context-conditional
political cycles ( Franzese, 2002 ). More precisely, the timing of electoral defence reductions is different across different coun-
try groups (NATO vs non-NATO members), while the size and signiﬁcance of partisan shifts in welfare spending become
stronger when we focus on certain social policy areas. 
According to the last prediction of our theoretical model ( Prediction 3 ), the timing of elections has a weaker inﬂuence
on military spending when a country is involved in conﬂicts. This happens because, in such economies, voters assign a
relatively higher value to military spending due to security considerations, and hence, policymakers do not have the same
capacity to gain votes by engaging in pre-electoral tradeoffs between “butter” and “guns”. We thus continue our analysis
by excluding the 6 countries with the highest frequency of external military operations and conﬂicts (as indicated by the
variable ‘Wars’), namely Canada, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. The results presented in
column (6) of Table 2 support the aforementioned prediction. Speciﬁcally, when we focus on the remaining 16 countries,
the coeﬃcient on ‘Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 ’ becomes larger in absolute value and retains its statistical signiﬁcance, suggesting
that the electoral-induced military cutbacks in the 6 excluded NATO countries are, on average, smaller. Our results persist
when we estimate the same regression package using PCSE (see lower part of Table 2 ). 
Finally, we run the regressions of Table 2 using the growth rate of military-to-social expenditure (‘TME’/‘TSE’) as de-
pendent variable, taking the timing of effects into account. As shown in Table 3a , the estimates on the political variables
support, once again, our theoretical predictions: governments sacriﬁce military spending around elections to enable vote-
seeking increases in social spending, especially in countries with no conﬂicts, and decide how to allocate national resources
to the two goods based on their ideological preferences. As expected, the results on the ratio of military-to-social expendi-
ture (which can more adequately capture the tradeoffs between “butter” and “guns”) are economically and statistically more
signiﬁcant than those reported in the previous tables. Similar results are obtained when we re-deﬁne the dependent vari-
able as the growth rate of military spending to the disaggregated measure of social spending (‘TME’/‘SSE’) - see lower part
of Table 3a . The partisan effects on the latter variable are much more pronounced, since the three social programs included
in ‘SSE’ are more inﬂuenced by government ideology. Finally, estimating the same regression set-up using ﬁxed (country)
effects and adding the lagged dependent variable does not change the inferences on the electoral and partisan variables (see
Table 3b ). 
6.2. Robustness Checks 
We test the robustness of our ﬁndings in several ways. First, we check whether the reported effects depend on country-
level idiosyncratic characteristics. Persson and Tabellini (2002 ; 2003 ) and Albalate et al. (2012) argue that the nature of
political system may affect ﬁscal policy maneuverability around elections. More precisely, they suggest that fewer vetoes
and more stable conditions in parliamentary regimes (compared to presidential regimes) and greater demand/preference
for broad-based ﬁscal instruments in proportional systems (compared to majoritarian systems) can induce more waste, rent
opportunities and re-distribution in favour of the majority and lead to higher electoral cycles in broad-based programs.
Similarly, one can argue that the design of ﬁscal relation across the levels of government can play an important role: high
degree of ﬁscal decentralization may induce opportunistic politicians to focus more on local public goods and generate
electoral cycles in geographically targeted programs during local (rather than central) government elections. Following this
discussion, we re-estimate the regression speciﬁcation of column (4) in Table 3a after excluding the countries with presi-
dential regimes, those with majoritarian elections, and those with the highest level of ﬁscal decentralization (as reported in
the 2009 OECD National Accounts Statistics). Estimates based on the restricted sub-samples of countries are similar to the
baseline estimates and the key ﬁndings presented in the previous section do not change (see columns (1)–(3) of Table 4 ).
Notice that the relatively larger electoral effects in columns (2) and (3) are mostly driven by the fact that some of the
excluded countries have high frequency of conﬂicts and thus less pronounced electoral military cycles. Indeed, when we
carry out the same robustness tests for the social expenditure equation, the electoral effects are remarkably consistent with30 We have also augmented the regression model with dummy variables coding both electoral and pre-electoral years for the two country groups, and 
performed equality tests on the estimated parameters. The results of these tests conﬁrm the reported ﬁndings. 
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Table 3a 
Political cycles in military-to-social expenditure ratio (1988-2009). 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: random-effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln GDP per capita 0.232 0.244 0.237 0.010 0.210 0.168 
(1.08) (1.16) (1.11) (0.04) (0.93) (0.67) 
ln Globalization 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
(0.38) (0.59) (0.59) (0.45) (0.66) (0.15) 
ln Armed Forces 0.020 ∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗ 0.020 ∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗
(2.09) (2.02) (2.01) (2.09) (2.22) 
ln Rivals 0.164 ∗ 0.158 ∗ 0.175 ∗ 0.175 ∗ 0.182 
(1.72) (1.67) (1.71) (1.97) (1.36) 
Volunteers 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.028 ∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.32) (2.98) 
Wars 0.021 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ 0.020 ∗∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗ 0.011 
(3.66) (3.82) (3.61) (2.91) (3.19) (1.03) 
Political Constraints 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.020 -0.053 ∗
(0.63) (0.69) (0.59) (0.60) (0.69) (1.65) 
NATO -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 
(0.28) (1.25) (0.27) (0.38) (0.53) (1.08) 
Election 0.007 
(0.88) 
Election ∗ NATO 1 0.010 
(1.23) 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.026 ∗∗
(3.19) (3.18) (3.00) (2.76) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗
(4.04) (4.03) (3.76) (4.12) (3.85) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.005 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.004 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.004 
(2.03) (2.05) (1.98) (2.03) (2.21) (1.34) 
ln Unemployment -0.041 ∗∗
(2.24) 
ln Dependency Ratio -0.332 
(0.88) 
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 460 460 460 460 460 334 
Number of N 22 22 22 22 22 16 
R 2 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: panel-corrected SE 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.029 ∗∗∗
(3.38) (3.27) (3.14) (2.71) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.023 ∗∗∗ -0.023 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.023 ∗∗∗ -0.023 ∗∗∗
(2.96) (2.92) (2.84) (2.90) (2.91) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.006 ∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗ -0.006 ∗
(2.30) (2.28) (2.17) (2.18) (2.14) (1.61) 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’); Method: random-effects 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.016 ∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗ -0.015 ∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗
(2.35) (2.39) (2.20) (2.17) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗
(3.45) (3.44) (3.06) (3.49) (3.12) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.008 ∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ -0.009 ∗∗
(2.43) (2.40) (2.40) (2.47) (2.52) (2.57) 
See notes for Table 2 . For brevity and comparability, the table displays the results of regressions with PCSE and the regressions 
on ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’) only for the variables of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 those in Table 1 (see Table A.3 ), suggesting that the nature of political system and ﬁscal decentralization have no signiﬁcant
impact on our ﬁndings. 
We also experiment with an alternative election indicator that allows the electoral effects to differ depending on whether
the election takes place very early in the year. 31 More precisely, we re-deﬁne the electoral variable to take value 1 in year t
if an election takes place during the last 10 months of year t and the ﬁrst 2 months of year t + 1 , and 0 otherwise. As shown
in column (4) of Table 4 , the ﬁndings discussed in Section 6.1 are not much inﬂuenced by this exercise. Another concern
with our results is that treating all elections as predetermined may bias our estimates of electoral cycles. As suggested by31 According to our theoretical framework, when a large fraction of voters is undecided, high levels of social spending are recognised as being politi- 
cally motivated, which creates a natural limit to governments’ opportunistic behaviour (see also Drazen and Eslava, 2010 ). Thus, the shift towards social 
expenditure is expected to occur only in the immediate period before elections. 
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Table 3b 
Political cycles in military-to-social expenditure ratio (1988-2009) (continued). 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: ﬁxed-effects 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.027 ∗∗
(3.35) (3.40) (3.14) (2.90) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗
(4.52) (4.50) (4.16) (4.69) (4.00) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.006 ∗ -0.006 ∗ -0.005 ∗ -0.005 ∗ -0.005 ∗ -0.005 
(2.07) (2.05) (2.01) (2.07) (1.98) (1.37) 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’); Method: ﬁxed-effects 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.017 ∗∗ -0.017 ∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗ -0.021 ∗∗
(2.55) (2.62) (2.37) (2.32) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗
(3.59) (3.59) (3.22) (3.65) (3.72) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.009 ∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ -0.010 ∗∗
(2.63) (2.59) (2.58) (2.65) (2.51) (2.60) 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: random-effects; including lagged dependent 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗∗ -0.024 ∗∗
(3.15) (3.15) (2.94) (2.53) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗∗
(3.64) (3.62) (3.36) (3.83) (3.16) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.005 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.004 
(2.02) (2.02) (1.96) (2.04) (2.20) (1.36) 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’); Method: random-effects; including lagged dependent 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.015 ∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗
(2.36) (2.41) (2.20) (2.02) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗
(3.28) (3.28) (2.83) (3.38) (3.08) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.008 ∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ -0.009 ∗∗
(2.39) (2.35) (2.36) (2.44) (2.48) (2.52) 
See notes for Table 2 . For brevity and comparability, the table displays the results only for the variables of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rogoff (1990) , incumbent governments may strategically choose the timing of elections depending on economic outcomes
and call early elections when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, when the election is known well in advance,
incumbent politicians have more time and greater opportunity to manipulate ﬁscal policy ( Brender and Drazen, 2005 ). To
address these issues, we consider a weighted electoral variable that takes the value 0.5 in the years of non-predetermined
elections, as in Efthyvoulou (2012) . 32 This does not change our baseline estimates either, suggesting that assigning the same
weight to all elections does not lead to misleading inferences (see column (5) of Table 4 ). The results for the political
variables remain also qualitatively the same when we leave the statistically insigniﬁcant control variables out of the model
speciﬁcation (see column (6)). 
Finally, we conduct further tests of robustness, such as using the CHECKS index of the World Bank’s DPI as an indicator of
political constraints (instead of the POLCON index) and implementing the tests described in this section using ﬁxed effects
and adding the lagged dependent variable in the static speciﬁcations. Once again, the inferences on the political variables,
as discussed in Section 6.1 , do not change (results available upon request). 
7. Conclusions 
The existing literature on political compositional budget cycles has focused on the interactive relationship between cur-
rent and capital expenditure, while the existing literature on the butter-vs-guns dilemma has mainly considered the eco-
nomic implications of military spending. No prior studies, however, have attempted to explain the butter-vs-guns tradeoff
within a political cycle setting: that is, how politicians use this tradeoff to gain votes or to curry partisan favour. The current
paper presents a theoretical model and empirical evidence aiming at ﬁlling this gap. Our analysis produces three key results.
First, incumbent politicians sacriﬁce military spending at elections times as a way to enable increases in social spending.
Second, the degree to which governments engage in such tradeoffs is smaller for countries involved in conﬂicts, where na-
tional security plays an important role on voter choice. Finally, the spending allocation to the two public goods depends on
the government’s political orientation: parties of the left favour increased allocations to “butter”, such as old age, family and
incapacity-related beneﬁts, whereas parties of the right favour increased allocations to “guns”. 
Our ﬁndings offer further insights on how incumbents manipulate public expenditure for political purposes and point
to three aspects of contextual variation in the emerging cycles. First, patterns of electioneering are not symmetric across32 We classify an election as predetermined if it is held either at the constitutionally determined election interval or within the expected year of the 
constitutionally ﬁxed term. Among the 180 elections in our full sample (1981-2009), 151 are classiﬁed as predetermined. 
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Table 4 
Political cycles in military-to-social expenditure ratio (1988-2009): robustness tests. 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: random-effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln GDP per capita -0.050 -0.146 -0.043 0.002 0.012 
(0.22) (0.58) (0.17) (0.01 (0.05) 
ln Globalization 0.001 0.001 0.04 0.001 0.001 
(0.44) (0.08) (1.39) (0.42) (0.45) 
ln Armed Forces 0.022 ∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗ 0.034 0.022 ∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗
(2.06) (2.17) (1.29) (2.10) (2.12) (2.21) 
ln Rivals 0.163 ∗ 0.158 0.169 ∗ 0.174 ∗ 0.172 ∗ 0.174 ∗
(1.90) (1.56) (1.91) (1.94) (1.96) (1.82) 
Volunteers 0.004 0.015 0.006 0.001 0.002 
(0.45) (1.55) (0.81) (0.13) (0.22) 
Wars 0.020 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗
(3.11) (2.99) (2.29) (2.92) (2.87) (3.55) 
Political Constraints 0.014 -0.017 0.067 ∗ 0.018 0.017 
(0.45) (0.41) (2.21) (0.60) (0.58) 
NATO -0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.57) (0.79) (0.75) (0.26) (0.44) 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.026 ∗∗∗ -0.026 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.021 ∗∗∗
(3.00) (3.66) (3.76) (3.48) (3.83) (3.57) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.015 ∗∗∗ -0.017 ∗∗∗ -0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.017 ∗∗∗
(3.80) (3.64) (3.54) (3.11) (3.80) (4.60) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.004 ∗ -0.004 -0.006 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.004 ∗∗ -0.004 ∗
(1.71) (1.43) (2.30) (2.02) (1.99) (1.93) 
ln Unemployment -0.048 ∗∗∗ -0.050 ∗∗∗ -0.029 ∗ -0.041 ∗∗ -0.041 ∗∗ -0.043 ∗∗
(2.96) (3.16) (1.80) (2.27) (2.21) (2.39) 
ln Dependency Ratio -0.292 -0.343 -0.625 -0.339 -0.312 
(0.80) (0.95) (1.42) (0.89) (0.82) 
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 439 376 334 460 460 460 
Number of N 21 18 16 22 22 22 
R 2 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: panel-corrected SE 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.028 ∗∗∗ -0.030 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.023 ∗∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗∗
(3.02) (3.08) (3.69) (3.22) (3.32) (2.30) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗ -0.024 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗
(2.79) (2.70) (2.11) (2.44) (2.82) (3.03) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.005 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗ -0.006 ∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗
(2.05) (1.80) (1.98) (2.15) (2.12) (1.77) 
Dependent variable: ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’); Method: random-effects 
Pre-Election ∗ NATO 1 -0.016 ∗∗ -0.020 ∗∗∗ -0.024 ∗∗∗ -0.015 ∗∗ -0.017 ∗∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗
(2.21) (2.66) (3.29) (2.27) (2.82) (2.57) 
Election ∗ NATO 0 -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ -0.012 ∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗
(2.99) (2.95) (2.17) (2.42) (3.05) (5.09) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.006 ∗∗ -0.009 ∗∗∗ -0.009 ∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗
(2.03) (2.69) (2.37) (2.48) (2.43) (2.41) 
Equation in column (1) excludes the countries with presidential regime: the United States. Equation 
in column (2) excludes the countries with majoritarian electoral system: Canada, France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Equation in column (3) excludes the six highest ﬁscally decentralised 
countries: Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Spain and Switzerland. Equation in column (4) controls 
for the timing of elections within the year. Equation in column (5) assigns a smaller weight to non- 
predetermined elections. Equation in column (6) excludes the statistically insigniﬁcant control variables. 
For brevity and comparability, the table displays the results of regressions with PCSE and the regressions 
on ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’) only for the variables of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 different types of expenditure: politicians respond to voters’ spending priorities and change the budget composition in a
way that can purchase votes more effectively. Second, both dimensions of political ideology (determined by welfare policy
preferences and foreign policy preferences) are inﬂuential in shaping the composition of public spending. Third, politicians’
incentives and capacity to enact electoral and partisan policies are affected by external economic constraints, the conﬂict
environment and strategic opportunities. These observations can explain why studies that focus on aggregate measures of
public expenditure, employ the same empirical speciﬁcation across different expenditure categories, and ignore the context
conditionality of political cycles, may ﬁnd weak empirical support for such cycles. As Franzese (2002 ; 2003 ) points out,
reports of the empirical demise of political cycle theories may have been greatly exaggerated and researchers should rekindle
their attention to this ﬁeld - especially in the direction of addressing theoretical and empirical inadequacies of prior models.
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Appendix A 
A.1. Further insights on partisan cycles 
In this section we provide additional insights on ideology regularities in social and military spending by looking at four
cases: Australia, Belgium, Spain and the United States . A visual inspection of Fig. A.1 reveals evidence of partisan cycles in
the allocation of public spending in Australia, where, from 1988 to 1996, Bob Hawke, leader of the Labor Party, increased
the share of social spending by more than 5 percentage points, while, on overage, military spending was slightly reduced.
We can then observe a remarkable change in policies from 1997 to 2007, as a Liberal-National coalition won the federal
elections and interrupted the left-wing government’s sharp increase in social spending. The growth in social spending was
again restored in 2007, when the Labor won the elections. 
Belgium is an interesting case as it exhibits a clear-cut tradeoff between social and military spending over the whole
period. In most years, drops in social spending are paralleled by increases in military spending and vice-versa. Moreover,
from 1988 on, we can see signs of partisan cycles, with a marked increase in social spending and a parallel decline in
military spending, partly because of the end of the Cold War and the ensuing partial disarmament across NATO countries.
From 1999, as the ideology index moves from 3 to 4, we can observe a noticeable growth in the level of social spending,
which reached an all-time high of almost 30% in 2009, and a continuous reduction in the level of military spending. 
Spain also provides support to the existence of partisan cycles in public spending. When Felipe González Márquez, Gen-
eral Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, came into power in 1982, he oversaw the establishment of a com-Fig. A.1. Single-country evidence of partisan cycles. 
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 prehensive welfare state, including the improvement of a number of social programs, such as pensions and unemployment
beneﬁts. Accordingly, social spending increased by almost 5 percentage points between 1988 and 1993, the year of the elec-
tions, while military spending steadily declined. When José María Aznar of the People’s party replaced the left-wing gov-
ernment, he implemented a number of cuts to both social and military spending, while the return of a leftist government,
under Zapatero, brought the level of social spending back to the 1993 levels. Military spending was left almost untouched,
and slightly increased after 2004, partially because of the Spanish involvement in Afghanistan. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the reduction in military spending in the US was accompanied by an
increase in social expenditure; notwithstanding the presence of a conservative presidency (George H. W. Bush), there was a
short term tradeoff between defence and welfare spending. Under Bill Clinton’s presidency (1993-2001), the military burden
was severely reduced, and went from 5% to almost 3% of the GDP. Social spending was, on average, much larger than in the
previous administration, but was reduced after the beginning of his second term, and then increased again slightly before
the elections in 2001. Under George W. Bush (2001-2009), there was a quick recovery in the share of the budget devoted
to the armed forces. Yet, the growth in social spending continued unabated at the beginning of his ﬁrst term, possibly
because of the inertia, then it was reduced toward his second term in oﬃce and increased again before the elections in
2009. Finally, under Obama, social spending was signiﬁcantly increased, in part due to worsening economic conditions after
the 2008 crisis. 
A.2. Tables 
See Table A.1 , Table A.2 and Table A.3 . 
Table A.1 
Number of elections in the sample (1988-2009). 
Country Elections Country Elections Country Elections 
Australia 8 (10) Greece 8 (10) Portugal 7 (9) 
Austria 7 (9) Ireland 6 (8) Spain 6 (8) 
Belgium 6 (8) Italy 7 (8) Sweden 6 (8) 
Canada 7 (8) Japan 7 (9) Switzerland 6 (7) 
Denmark 8 (10) Luxembourg 5 (6) United Kingdom 5 (6) 
Finland 6 (7) Netherlands 6 (9) United States 6 (7) 
France 5 (7) New Zealand 8 (10) 
Germany 7 (8) Norway 6 (8) 
The number in parenthesis indicates the number of elections included in the full 
sample for social expenditure (1981-2009). 
Table A.2 
Descriptive statistics and data sources (1988-2009). 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Source 
Total Social Expenditure 482 21.7 4.9 10.7 35.7 SOCX 
(% of GDP) 
Subcomponents of Social 482 11.7 3.4 5.0 20.4 SOCX 
Expenditure (% of GDP) 
GDP per capita 484 23848.1 8941.6 7930.4 56389.2 WDI 
Unemployment Rate 484 7.1 3.6 0.5 23.9 WDI 
Globalization 484 77.1 12.6 36.0 98.9 Dreher (2006) a 
(KOF economic subindex) 
Dependency Ratio 484 49.7 3.3 43.1 65.2 WDI 
Political Constraints 484 0.49 0.09 0.23 0.72 Henisz (20 0 0) 
(POLCON index) 
Total Military Expenditure 484 1.9 0.9 0.5 5.8 SIPRI 
(% of GDP) 
Armed Forces (% of Labour) 484 1.2 0.8 0.1 5.2 SDM 
Rivals 484 3133.4 17177.0 0 218402 Dunne et al. (2009) 
Volunteers 484 0.25 0.43 0 1 Bove and Cavatorta (2012) 
Wars 484 0.15 0.35 0 1 COW 
Election 484 0.27 0.45 0 1 Various Sources 
Ideology (Left-Wing) 484 2.9 0.9 1 4 Potrafke (2009) 
SOCX : OECD Social Expenditure Database; WDI : World Bank’s World Development Indicators; SIPRI : Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute; COW : Correlates of War Project; SDM : Swedish Defence Ministry; a KOF 
Index of Globalization, Version 2013. 
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 Table A.3 
Political cycles in social expenditure (1988-2009): robustness tests. 
Dependent variable: ln Total Social Expenditure ( ln TSE), ln Subcomponents of Social Expenditure ( ln SSE); Method: Bias-corrected LSDV 
ln TSE ln SSE ln TSE ln SSE ln TSE ln SSE ln TSE ln SSE ln TSE ln SSE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lagged Dependent 0.225 ∗∗∗ 0.243 ∗∗∗ 0.199 ∗∗∗ 0.250 ∗∗∗ 0.216 ∗∗∗ 0.232 ∗∗∗ 0.225 ∗∗∗ 0.233 ∗∗∗ 0.227 ∗∗∗ 0.233 ∗∗∗
(5.08) (5.13) (4.07) (4.85) (4.22) (4.29) (5.22) (5.12) (5.28) (5.12) 
ln GDP per capita -0.800 ∗∗∗ -0.873 ∗∗∗ -0.792 ∗∗∗ -0.873 ∗∗∗ -0.773 ∗∗∗ -0.791 ∗∗∗ -0.796 ∗∗∗ -0.880 ∗∗∗ -0.801 ∗∗∗ -0.884 ∗∗∗
(7.22) (6.73) (6.52) (6.19) (6.37) (5.38) (7.87) (7.41) (7.94) (7.45) 
ln Unemployment 0.031 ∗∗∗ 0.006 0.031 ∗∗ 0.008 0.013 -0.003 0.030 ∗∗∗ 0.007 0.030 ∗∗∗ 0.007 
(2.63) (0.46) (2.16) (0.47) (0.84) (0.17) (2.63) (0.49) (2.61) (0.48) 
ln Globalization -0.004 ∗∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗∗ -0.004 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗ -0.08 ∗∗∗ -0.004 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗ -0.004 ∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗
(2.58) (2.89) (2.16) (2.44) (2.74) (3.34) (2.45) (2.74) (2.50) (2.76) 
ln Dependency Ratio 0.067 0.372 0.122 0.299 0.148 0.659 ∗ 0.066 0.312 0.054 0.303 
(0.26) (1.24) (0.42) (0.88) (0.53) (1.91) (0.26) (1.04) (0.22) (1.02) 
Political Constraints -0.013 0.006 0.002 0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.013 0.005 -0.012 0.005 
(0.43) (0.17) (0.05) (0.10) (0.36) (0.11) (0.39) (0.13) (0.38) (0.14) 
Election 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗ 0.007 ∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗ 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.006 ∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗
(3.09) (2.06) (2.42) (1.70) (2.61) (2.12) (2.61) (1.82) (2.88) (1.92) 
Ideology (Left-Wing) 0.002 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.003 ∗ 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.003 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.002 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.002 0.005 ∗∗∗
(1.54) (3.12) (1.72) (3.17) (1.63) (2.67) (1.39) (2.88) (1.37) (2.87) 
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 437 437 374 374 332 332 458 458 458 458 
Number of N 21 21 18 18 16 16 22 22 22 22 
See notes for Table 1 . Equations in columns (1) and (2) exclude the countries with presidential regime: the United States. Equations in columns (3)
and (4) exclude the countries with majoritarian electoral system: Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Equations in columns (5) and
(6) exclude the six highest ﬁscally decentralised countries: Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Spain and Switzerland. Equations in columns (7) and (8)
control for the timing of elections within the year. Equations in columns (9) and (10) assign a smaller weight to non-predetermined elections. 
A.3. Theoretical model: proofs 
A.3.1. Equation 7 
In the election period, a bad politician chooses the level of military expenditure g 1 = s when 
U I (g 1 = s/ω P = ω L )  U I (g 1 = g ∗∗(π I ) /ω P = ω L ) (A.i)
First, we get an expression for both components 
U I (g 1 = s/ω P = ω L ) = 
ω L 
( 
f (s ) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − π I 
)2 ) + X + 
β
⎡ 
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣ 
ρ( s ) 
[
ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(π I )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − π I 
)2 )+ X + l (π I )h (s − g ∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) ]+ 
( 1 − ρ(s ) ) 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎢ ⎣ 
p 
(
ω L 
(
f (s ) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πC 
)2 )− (π I − πC )2 )+ 
( 1 − p ) 
(
ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(πC )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πC 
)2 )+ l (πC )h (s − g ∗∗(πC )) − (π I − πC )2 )
⎤ 
⎥ ⎥ ⎦ 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦ 
U I (g 1 = g ∗∗(π I ) /ω P = ω L ) = 
ω L 
( 
f (g ∗∗(π I )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − π I 
)2 ) + X + l (π I )h (s − g ∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I ))+ 
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 β
⎡ 
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣ 
ρ
(
g ∗∗(π I ) 
)[
ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(π I )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − π I 
)2 )+ X + l (π I )h (s − g ∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) ]+ 
(
1 − ρ(g ∗∗(π I ) 
)
⎡ 
⎢ ⎢ ⎣ 
p 
(
ω L 
(
f (s ) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πC 
)2 )− (π I − πC )2 )+ 
( 1 − p ) 
(
ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(πC )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πC 
)2 )+ l (π I )h (s − g ∗∗(πC )) − (π I − πC )2 )
⎤ 
⎥ ⎥ ⎦ 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦ 
Substituting the last couple of equations into (A.i) and rearranging terms, we obtain 
ω L 
(
f (s ) − f (g ∗∗(π I )) 
)
− l 
(
π I 
)
h (s − g ∗∗(π I )) − n (s − g ∗∗(π I ))+ 
β
[
ρ(s ) − ρ(g ∗∗(π I )) 
][ ( 
ω L 
( 
f (g ∗∗(π I )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − π I 
)2 ) + X + l (π I )h (s − g ∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) 
) ] 
+ 
β
[
ρ(g ∗∗(π I )) − ρ(s ) 
]⎡ ⎣ 
(
ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(πC )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πC 
)2 )− ((π I − πC )2 ))+ 
p 
(
ω L 
[
f (s ) − f (g ∗∗(πC )) 
])
+ (1 − p) l(π I )) h (s − g ∗∗(πC )) 
⎤ 
⎦  0 
Deﬁne H(g ∗∗(π I )) = ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(π I )) − f (s ) 
)
+ l 
(
π I 
)
h 
(
s − g ∗∗(π I ) 
)
. Using this expression and rearranging terms, the previ-
ous condition becomes 
β
[
ρ(s ) − ρ(g ∗∗(π I )) 
][ ( 
ω L 
( 
f (g ∗∗(π I )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − π I 
)2 ) + X + l (π I )h (s − g ∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) 
) ] 
+ 
β
[
ρ(g ∗∗(π I )) − ρ(s ) 
]⎡ ⎣ 
(
ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(πC )) − 1 
N 
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πC 
)2 )− ((π I − πC )2 ))+ 
p 
(
ω L 
(
f (s ) − f (g ∗∗(πC )) 
))
+ (1 − p) l(π I ) h (s − g ∗∗(πC )) 
⎤ 
⎦ 
 H(g ∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) 
Further rearrangement yields 
β
[
ρ(s ) − ρ(g ∗∗(π I )) 
]
⎡ 
⎢ ⎢ ⎣ 
[(
ω L 
(
f (g ∗∗(π I )) − f (g ∗∗(πC )) 
)
+ 
X + l 
(
π I 
)[(
h (s − g ∗∗(π I )) − h (s − g ∗∗(πC )) 
)]
+ n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) 
)]
+ 
pH(g ∗∗(πC )) + 1 
N 
(
N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − πC 
)2 − N ∑ 
i =1 
(
π i − π I 
)2 )+ (π I − πC )2 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎥ ⎦ 
 H(g ∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) 
Finally, we obtain that 
H(g ∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) ≤
β
[
ρ(s ) − ρ(g ∗∗(π I )) 
][
H(g ∗∗(π I )) − H(g ∗∗(πC )) 
]
+ X + pH(g ∗∗(πC )) + n (s − g ∗∗(π I )) +  (A.ii) 
A.3.2. Footnote 13 
When the economy is in conﬂict, condition (A.i) becomes 
U I (g 1 = g ∗/ω = ω L )  U I (g 1 = g ∗∗∗(π I ) /ω = ω L ) (A.iii)
Using (A.iii) and following the same procedure as above, we arrive at the following condition: 
 ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗∗(π I )) − n (s − g ∗) ≤ (A.iv) 
β
[
ρ(g ∗) − ρ(g ∗∗∗(π I ) 
][
 ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(π I )) −  ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(πC )) 
]
+ X + p ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(πC )) + n (s − g ∗∗∗(π I )) +  (A.v) 
where 
 ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(π I )) = ω L 
⎡ 
⎣ f (g ∗∗∗(π I )) − f (g ∗) + b(s − g ∗∗∗(π I )) − b(s − g ∗) ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
voters’ utility change 
⎤ 
⎦ + l (π I )[h (s − g ∗∗∗(π I ) )− h ( s − g ∗) ] (A.vi) 
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 Compared to the case of a peaceful economy there are two main differences. First, the most preferred level of military
expenditure for the politician changes to g ∗∗∗( π I ). Second, the deﬁnition includes other elements since: (i) voters assign
now positive value to military expenditure and the change in their utility is part of the politician’s opportunity cost; and (ii)
the positive level of military expenditure in the election period affects the utility of politicians (reﬂected in the last element
in (A.vi) ). Finally, note that the loss in “status” to the incumbent politician when playing g ∗ instead of g ∗∗∗( π I ) is different
from that when playing s instead of g ∗∗( π I ). 
A.3.3. Equation 10 
The Bayes’ theorem states that 
Pr (ω P = ω H /g 1 = s ) = Pr (g 1 = s/ω P = ω H ) Pr ( ω P = ω H ) 
Pr ( g 1 = s ) 
Notice that: (i) Pr (g 1 = s/ω P = ω H ) = 1 , since a good politician always follows that strategy; (ii) Pr ( ω P = ω H ) = p is an
assumption in the model; and, (iii) Pr ( g 1 = s ) = p + ( 1 − p ) q, since a proportion p of politicians are “good” and thus always
play s , while a proportion ( 1 − p ) of politicians are “bad” and thus play g 1 = s with probability q . Substituting these three
probabilities into the previous condition the result follows. 
A.3.4. Equilibria when the economy is in conﬂict 
We can make a distinction between three cases depending on whether the following condition holds: 
 ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(π I )) + n (s − g ∗∗∗(π I )) − n (s − g ∗) ≤
β
[
 ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(π I )) −  ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(πC )) 
]
+ X + p ˜ H (g ∗∗∗(πC )) + n (s − g ∗∗∗(π I )) +  (A.vii)
Case 1: If condition (A.vii) holds with strict inequality, the incumbent will choose to play g 1 = g ∗ with probability 1,
and the swing voters will set p(g 1 = g ∗) = p and zero otherwise. Hence, the swing voters will vote for the incumbent with
probability r  1 / 2 −φ
I 
φM 
and the incumbent will get re-elected with probability 1 provided that he plays g 1 = g ∗. In this case
we have a pooling equilibrium since both good and bad politicians are playing the same set of strategies. 
Case 2: If condition (A.vii) holds with strict equality, the incumbent will choose to play g 1 = g ∗ with probability q , the
swing voters will set p 1 (g 1 = g ∗)  p and zero otherwise. The incumbent will thus get re-elected with probability 1 provided
that he plays g 1 = g ∗. In this case we have a mixed equilibrium. 
Case 3: If condition (A.vii) does not hold (LHS of (A.vii) > RHS of (A.vii) ), the incumbent will choose to play g ∗∗∗( π I ),
and the swing voters will set p(g 1 = g ∗) = 1 and zero otherwise. Hence, the swing voters will vote for the challenger with
probability 1, resulting in the incumbent losing the elections. In this case we have a separating equilibrium since good and
bad politicians are playing different strategies in the election period. 
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